

One of the principal organisers in AMSTERDAM used as headquarters an apartment in a boarding-house which was owned by a German lady whom he had known before the War. Up to October 1944 only German officers had lived in the building. When they moved out, no one would take a room there, so the organiser took the whole of the top floor. At first he used it as his headquarters when he was in charge of the transportation of stores and later as the headquarters of the whole of the organisation in AMSTERDAM. Nobody knew he was there and the room was rented in somebody else's name. If the house was searched while he was there he would be a doctor visiting a patient.

#### In the Country.

In the country districts - notably in the VELuwe and the OVERIJSSSEL - isolated farm houses were used for all purposes and men lived in fox-holes in wadis style. Headquarters in these areas were mobile, and groups moved from place to place as and when events made a move necessary. Headquarters in these country districts would usually comprise three farm houses within 30 minutes' cycling distance one from the other - one farm housing the chief of staff and his assistant, one accommodating the Zone commander, and a third in which the W/T operator functioned. A courier service would ensure communications. Isolated country houses, clergyman's houses, garages or smithies were also used.

#### CONTACT ADDRESSES AND RENDEZVOUS POINTS.

Most organisations used for internal communications accommodation addresses which were changed every month, or as and when necessary, and which were used as courier terminal points. These accommodation addresses were usually banks, large shops, doctors' surgeries or any premises where a number of people could go in and out without attracting attention. In the main it was thought that the doctor's surgery was the best place to be used as an accommodation address. Private houses were used, however, for this purpose, as were libraries, cafes and churches. The bank's safe deposit system was used by making a safe deposit box a dead bolt-aux-lettres, the necessary keys being given to all users with the connivance of the bank employees.

To maintain communications in country districts, there was always a contact address somewhere near the headquarters of the Zone. Here messages could be deposited without necessitating a visit to headquarters itself. This contact address would often be a shop in a village near to which headquarters was located.

Meetings were held in business premises during working hours, in doctors' surgeries and in private houses. One meeting, for instance, took place in the offices of the Chamber of Commerce in one of the larger towns. The meeting took place in a private room allotted to the organisation and, although work was going on in the offices of the Chamber of Commerce, nobody knew that a meeting was taking place with the exception of the director's secretary, who had been warned about the meeting 30 minutes before it was due to commence.

### TRAINING PREMISES.

In 1944 and 1945 larger classes were arranged in towns, and agents were trained in groups of 20 to 30 at a time in swimming baths, gymnasia, dance halls etc. Small classes were held in shops, private houses, stables or garages. In the country men gathered in farmhouses to receive their training, or alternatively in fields well off the beaten track and with guards posted.

### W/T SITES.

As already stated, most W/T operators were agents newly arrived from England, and in general the group for whom they were working found transmitting sites for them through friends or contacts or again with the assistance of L.O. Priests and doctors were also of great assistance in finding transmitting sites for operators. In some cases, however, it was left to the agent himself to find places from which to work. Some agents during their mission used as many as 50 different houses, being obliged to move frequently owing to the danger of enemy O/F-ing activity. Consequently, without assistance from the organisation it was very difficult for them to find suitable premises. Frequently they were forced to transmit from houses in which other forms of clandestine activity were taking place, with obvious danger to their security.

Using a suitable cover story, an operator seeking a transmitting site would visit a house, flat or farm, and, having examined it from the technical viewpoint, would try to rent accommodation without revealing why he needed it. In most cases, however, this was impossible and the operator was obliged to take the people into his confidence. If they were unwilling to co-operate, he merely asked them to forget the incident and withdrew. Needless to say, the operator would only visit people whose names had been given him by friends or acquaintances in resistance.

The following are extracts from reports received from two operators working in AMSTERDAM:

"A priest, a Protestant minister and a doctor did all the searching for addressees. When the two cadres and the doctor had found their addressees, the two operators went round inspecting them to see if they were suitable. Some were not high enough; some had too thin walls. It was preferable to have unoccupied flats round the one chosen, and operating always had to be done away from an adjoining apartment, especially during the night, so that the neighbours would not hear anything. The occupants of the premises chosen only knew they were being used to operate from but nothing else. The owners of those houses not chosen merely thought that the two operators were young doctors looking for somewhere to live and that the rooms were unsuitable for some reason best known to the operators."

"One agent had a W/T site in a house opposite a school to which he had a key, and there were plenty of facilities in the school for hiding material."

"The other agent's headquarters was situated in the basement of one of the houses of a hospital. Entrance



was obtained through the house of the hospital's chief engineer, out into the garden in the centre of the hospital and down some stone stairs leading to an unlit corridor below the nurse's house. At intervals along the passage metal plates, approximately 3 ft. x 3 ft., were riveted to the wall. The first two would not come away when pulled by a hole in the middle but the third let down on chains when a piece of wire was pushed downwards through the hole to release a catch. These metal plates were about waist height. Behind the plate this removed was a fairly large, low cellar where it was impossible to stand up straight and which was below ground level. No one, not even the director of the hospital, knew what was happening, or that anything was happening, except the chief engineer of the hospital, who helped the agent to set up his C.P. The agent would use various covers to get into his C.P. - either that of a doctor, a nurse or a plumber. He nearly always rang up the chief engineer before coming to see that everything was all right and he enquired again of the chief engineer when he passed through his house before going down to his C.P. if it were still all right. The C.P. was equipped with everything to enable the agent to stay down there, if necessary, for any length of time. He had in it his broadcast receiver and transmitter sets, his T.D. apparatus, inside and outside telephones, spare accumulators and other spares for his W/T sets, food, water, heating, electric light, hand grenades and fire-arms etc. If, for any reason, the warning system failed and the agent could not get out of his C.P. before the police reached the passage, it would be highly probable that they would not find it and if they did he was prepared to fight it out. All the materials were taken down there at night and special rubber-soled shoes were asked for from England to enable them to walk up and down the passage. It took two months to equip the C.P. fully. The agent had a house telephone in his C.P. with a secret number which only the chief engineer knew, so that the latter could ring him up and warn him of any danger. He, though, could ring up any one from this phone, both inside and outside the hospital, through the secret exchange. The only snag was that certain very high-pitched Morse tunces vibrated on the central heating pipes which ran through the cellar and could be heard in the room immediately above, so the occupant of the room above was moved out and a woman put in who knew she must not speak about any peculiar noises she might hear. One of the agent's reasons for choosing this place for his C.P. was that it was safe from bombardment as it had several feet of steel and concrete above. He wanted to be able to go on transmitting even if AMSTERDAM were being bombarded right until the very end."

#### SECRET TELEPHONE EXCHANGES.

For the manipulation of the black telephone system, which will be discussed later, many secret telephone exchanges existed all over Holland. Old houses and shops were chosen, and for this purpose the solidly-built Dutch house, with its thick walls and many steps, stairs and cupboards, was ideal. Houses with suitable facilities were chosen, or, where these facilities did not exist, carpenters and builders were called in to construct

hidden rooms and cupboards. The Dutch are very clever at this type of work, and many ingenious hide-outs were thus created. However, in every case two or three men would be required for a number of days to do the work entailed, with obvious security implications. In some cases an attic or cellar would be sub-divided and a secret room walled off, entrance being made in the secret room through a cleverly constructed door which could not be found without a long search. In other cases the rooms would be completely built in, leaving no means of entry other than a secret door constructed in the fire-place of an adjoining room.



Security Precautions

The following extracts illustrate security precautions taken by agents in the Field:-

"EQUARD had his own men in touch with or working in SD offices and was thus fully informed with regard to planned raids or impending SD activity.

HQ and dwelling places were changed as frequently as possible, and the addressee known only to the minimum number of people."

"In the office informant kept a certain amount of material connected with his insurance business and had he been questioned would have attempted to explain his presence there by saying that his Insurance Company's office had been bombed and that he was continuing to do his work in the office lent him by his friend.

One precaution, however, was taken in that the manager of the factory had a bell push under his desk, by means of which he could warn informant if the Germans were visiting the factory.

In the office itself, informant had, with the connivance of the factory manager's brother, who was an engineer, constructed a cavity in the floor in which a large box containing his weapons, papers and other incriminating material was stored. The cavity was carefully concealed by a concrete slab on which stood a large electric fire. The box itself could be raised to the surface by means of an electrical lift which the engineer had installed in the room. By pressing a switch, the cavity in the floor could be opened or shut at will and the box raised to the surface very quickly and without any trouble at all. In case of alarm, everything would have been put into the box and lowered into the floor."

"Apart from an understanding among the members of informant's group and among all contacts that warning of enemy action was to be circulated immediately, no security rules existed in the organization. Informant's own personal courier knew all addressees and could warn everybody in a very short time."

"He always had one house, the address of which was known to nobody, where he could go and sleep with no fear of his whereabouts being betrayed. He had a small office consisting of one room which he used as his headquarters and whose whereabouts was never known to more than two or three persons at the most.

He had a chain of rendezvous addressees where he could meet and discuss his work with other resistance leaders. These meeting places were never used more than twice running, and new rendezvous addressees were acquired as often as possible."

"Informant's organization was careful to remain as anonymous as possible, and provided them with only one address, which automatically became obsolete if any arrest were made."

"With regard to meetings in houses, they had certain safety signals (e.g. ringing of the door bell) and in addition a girl was posted at a second floor window, from which she could see who was ringing the bell, and in the case of a stranger, she would immediately sound the alarm before going to open the door, thus giving them time to hide all compromising material. When it was impossible to hide everything in time they went to the door armed with their Sten guns and pistols, etc."

"Source remarked that the most important qualifications for a house were that entrance might be made unobtrusively, that bicycles might be taken inside, and that there should be a means of escape in case of a raid. Source had one safety house which he used only as a refuge, and not for training."

The only safety signal used was the ringing of the door bell in a special way to obtain admittance. Only certain men were allowed to visit HQ."

"Informant used his own home as his headquarters throughout the occupation, and kept all illegal material in a suitcase which never left his side. His plan if the police called was to lower this suitcase from a window into the garden of his next-door neighbour."

As regards the concealment of illegal material at the printing office, informant said that it would have been easy enough to hide anything among the masses of material in the office."

"At first security was exceedingly poor - e.g. as many as 20 or 30 men would attend for arms instruction, each bringing a bicycle and leaving it outside the premises! Agent forbade this and instructed all trainees that they should arrive on foot, in small groups and at different times."

On arrival in ROTTERDAM, agent found that only one central arms depot, containing the entire supply of arms, existed. Agent at once decentralized, in case of a razzia.

An agent should never know the address of his chief, and should know as little of the organization as is compatible with efficiency. (Agent says that an exception to this rule was to be found in the case of couriers, who, of necessity, knew several addresses.)"

"As far as possible he changed houses from time to time and had his set moved. This was always done by a girl, sometimes by JOS. When the agent was going to transmit from a house where he was not known a password was used and at certain premises the safety signal was always used. At one time he was using the old Belgian Legation, which was inhabited only by a concierge and where he fitted up the set between the ceiling and the roof, thus working in complete concealment."



"With regard to the first four places mentioned, informant had nothing of interest to say. At the farm where he was living in ELIEDEN, there were four means of egress, and from his own room he had a very clear view of the surrounding countryside and could see for very long distances. He arranged with the farmer's son that if anything should happen while he was away from the farm, a message would be sent through to headquarters who would contact him by messenger. There were no other safety precautions and informant relied on the service of people in the organisation who quickly circulated news of enemy activities.

He had several hiding places, all well scattered, in outhouses and stables. At the headquarters at DEURNE the smith was always working, during the day, in the front of the house, and his wife worked at the back. At night the headquarters at DEURNE was never used.

There was no material stored at headquarters, in the house, but arms and explosives were hidden in a water-proof box in the garden. Informant knew of no other material which was kept at the house."

"This man took the house over in his own name and allowed informant to live there. BOB and META lived in the house as a "jeune menage", informant passing himself off as META's brother. The neighbours accepted them without question. Nobody knew of this address except informant's reception committee chief. It was impossible to find hiding places in the house and they were always armed in the house and ready to repel any attack made upon them. The only security precaution taken was a vase of flowers placed in a particular position in the window which would indicate to any of the residents returning home that it was safe to enter."

"When the agent had an appointment at the second flat he would go there before the appointment and await the arrival of the person he was going to see. The safety signal used was that the hall of the flat, a very dark place, was kept in semi-darkness unless there was danger, in which case the electric light was lit, and could be seen from outside. It would have been normal for the light to be lit when someone was admitted to the flat, so that had any unwelcome visitors arrived before the appointment it would have been perfectly possible for the person coming for the appointment to see that there was danger."

"Only five people knew the H.Q. building - the organiser, the liaison officer, a girl courier, a girl secretary and a despatch rider."

"Informant's home after he left the 'safe house' in ROTTERDAM was a ground floor flat in a block. His friend VAN VELZEN knew the neighbours, who evinced no curiosity when informant arrived there. To them he was just another refractaire, and they did not talk. This also applied to the middle-aged couple whose flat it was. There were two exits from the apartment. Informant was unable to find a suitable hiding place in his room for incriminating material, and hesitated to ask the owners of the flat. He therefore locked his codes in a metal box, which he placed, together with his other belongings,

in a locked suitcase. He always locked the door of his room when going out, and was always very alert and careful when leaving or returning to his home. He always called first at a neighbour's house before going home to find out if anything interesting had happened in the neighbourhood during his absence."

"SWARTE WIM once slept for three weeks in a different house every night because nobody dared to have him. He got his addresses from L.O. He asked them for 10 or 12 and used some as cover addresses and some to live in. He had no time to find addresses for himself."

"Together with the boy whom he was given as his assistant, he organised a system of guards for the various safe houses. They were four girls who cycled round the house reporting every car which appeared in the immediate neighbourhood. If all were well, they carried a handkerchief in their hand but, the absence of the handkerchief indicated danger. Informant made this arrangement bearing his security training at Group "B" in mind."

"They had to be very careful to keep the group as small as possible; when they made outside contacts, they never allowed outsiders to know where they were living or what their real names were. Appointments were always made away from their own homes."

Informant never made any really serious attempt to conceal her materials and papers when she had them in her room, because she knew that there was no way of hiding them from any thorough search. She simply scattered them about the room, hidden under other objects."

"At the beginning private houses were always used for meetings, and when this was the case members always arrived singly and at different specified times, the leader, BRAKENS, always being the last to arrive. The safe houses were always the property of a personal friend of the organisation whom they knew they could trust. These people did not know exactly what was going on but realised that, whatever and whoever they saw or heard, they must be discreet about it, and knew that in some way they were helping the resistance. Informant states that at these meetings cover stories were not arranged beforehand, but as soon as the members were assembled the first thing they did was to arrange one, such as playing cards etc. These safe houses were selected by all members, Capt. PIETERS acting as courier between the other members."



## INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

### Couriers

Girl couriers were used extensively by the Underground Movement, and indeed, they maintained 50% of internal communications. In general, couriers and the "black" telephone provided practically all internal communication facilities. The girls would travel about on bicycles, carrying verbal or written messages, and using as cover a pretended visit to relatives, or an expedition in search of food, milk, etc. They were not specially trained, but acquitted themselves admirably of their task. In their own districts they were well-known, and their excursions aroused no interest or suspicion. Only in the later stages of the occupation did the Germans begin to stop and search women. Many cases were known in the later stages of women being stripped and thoroughly searched. Written messages were usually carried in the frames of bicycles or concealed in handbags or shopping baskets, or frequently in the lining of a costume. The messages were taken to a courier terminal point, where they were collected by another courier or cut-out. Most Regional Commanders maintained a separate courier service consisting of about 20 girls who covered their own particular areas on foot or on bicycles. An agent would thus only need to send his own personal courier with a message to the Headquarters of the Internal Communications Section, and the latter would then take on the responsibility of delivering the message to the addressee. The couriers were trained gradually by experience, and worked out their own alibis. In the towns, many posed as housewives doing their daily shopping. Organisers were unanimous in their high praise of the girls' achievements and their courage and devotion. The girls frequently accepted missions which the men refused to undertake. The girls were not trained, but relied on their thorough knowledge of local conditions and on their natural resource to get them through.

As a precautionary measure, the couriers were often rested for some considerable time whilst new couriers were used in their place. By this means no courier could learn too much about locations, nor did they become familiar figures in any one place for any length of time. Another precaution taken was that each courier had instructions to say that she did not know where to deliver the message if she were stopped and searched en route. Her story would be that she had been given a message by some unknown person with a request to deliver it to another person in the town or elsewhere at a fixed rendezvous. Each courier normally knew a number of addressees which were unknown to other couriers, and only the Chief of the Internal Communications Section would know all the addressees used. He always knew where each courier should be, and how long the courier's job should take, and if the courier did not return punctually a search was made. Couriers were sometimes arrested with their letters upon them, but the system worked sufficiently well in that no further arrests were made as a result. In the case of an arrest, all addressees known by the courier arrested were warned and the people living there immediately moved elsewhere. Couriers frequently changed their clothes to confuse possible followers, and inconspicuous girls were chosen for the work. There was little risk of women being picked up in razzias.



Live letter-boxes were used as contact addresses and collecting points with the necessary security precautions (see Previous). Out-lets were frequently used for the collection of messages left by couriers at these points. One very ingenious live letter-box was used by an agent at AFKLDORRN, who obtained military information by having a group in every village responsible to a chief, who would collate the intelligence acquired by his group, place it in an envelope marked with a blue cross, but with no address, and send a courier to a small village near AFKLDORRN where the courier would leave the envelope in the official letter-box at the Post Office. Envelopes were always deposited before 9.30 a.m. between 9.30 a.m. and 10 a.m. the official responsible for the Post Office extracted the letters, put them aside, and the courier called at 10 a.m. at the Post Office and carried the messages away to the organizer's address. In this manner by 11 a.m. every day the organizer had in his possession up-to-date military information for the whole region. The couriers who went with the information only knew they were to put the envelopes in the letter-box at the Post Office. The official at the Post Office only knew the courier who called to collect the envelopes, and he asked no questions. He had a perfect alibi, as he could always say he did not know who left the letters or for whom they were destined.

#### Personal Meetings.

Much clandestine work was planned at personal meetings between agents who knew each other's address and called openly to discuss their work, but always with a suitable alibi, and having previously fixed the time and the reason for the meeting by telephone, employing veiled language. Meetings were very often arranged by telephone, using conventional phrases to indicate the time and place. Most meetings took place indoors, and when more than three or four people were to meet, suitable cover stories were always arranged collectively for all the people concerned. Some organizers, having fixed a meeting, took the precaution of sending a cut-out to transact business for them, providing him with the necessary means of identification. One method of arranging a meeting was to mail a business letter fixing a business appointment, but with the necessary conventions pre-arranged. This was, of course, only possible when the post functioned normally.

#### Post.

Up to 1943, when the official post functioned normally, it was used as a means of intercommunication. After 1943, however, there were to all intents and purposes no facilities for public use except inside towns. In the early days of the occupation letters in connection with clandestine work were sent through the normal Post Office system, but veiled language was always used. Frequently the Post Office officials worked hand-in-glove with the Underground Movement. One service rendered by the Postmaster in a small town was the handling of correspondence addressed to a certain name, the addressee supposedly living at a boarding-house in the town. This correspondence was really destined for the local organizer.





that there were no signs of any form of censorship or  
interference. Telegrams were, however, frequently  
lost by the service, and this means of communication  
was therefore not utilized. The reason for not using  
the post when it was possible was the delay involved,  
and the inefficiency of the postal service, which made  
receipt of a letter by post very uncertain. Some letters  
were not used as most agents regarded them as un-  
safe. Codes and ciphers were rarely used for internal  
communications due to the delay entailed and, in most  
cases, to the limited staff available for cipher work.  
Routine messages were sent in veiled language by post,  
and carriers carried messages in clear or in veiled  
language. They sometimes carried important messages in  
code or reports in clear but without names and ad-  
dresses in the report reproduced in code. In these  
cases they were ignorant of the details of the messages  
they carried. Combinations were used for time and place  
conventions used to arrange a meeting. One method employed  
by a field controller was to send a veiled language letter  
by post announcing the place of the meeting, and later on  
to send a bill of certain expenses in which certain figures  
would indicate the time of the meeting.



[illegible][illegible]

apart from this incident, and now I was never troubled by the Germans and worked so well for me and my wife, at least I remained until the liberation.

For guidance on the secret telephone network installed by informant, see diagrams attached.

1. The first part of the report is a summary of the situation in the country.

2. The second part of the report is a summary of the situation in the country.

3. The third part of the report is a summary of the situation in the country.

In summary, it can be said that

4. The fourth part of the report is a summary of the situation in the country.



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I have been thinking about you a lot lately. I hope you are well and happy. I am still in the same old place, but I am trying to make the best of it. I am still in the same old place, but I am trying to make the best of it. I am still in the same old place, but I am trying to make the best of it.

Best of luck to you.

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When recruits were required, some organizers could take recourse to youth in Venezuela, students' organizations etc. with whom they had been in touch before the war. There, who included prominent positions in administrations or in the liberal professions, had a wide field for recruiting new members. Dr. "A" is a typical example. He was a prominent member of the Doctors' League and Committee, friend to the German representative measures, and knowing all the doctors in the country. He was in possession of a very long list of useful contacts well placed to assist him in his work. He never approached any of these contacts himself in business connected with the resistance, but instructed one or the other of his assistants to visit a contact and recruit him without mentioning Dr. "A's" name. The person sent to recruit a new member did not even know Dr. "A" himself, and the potential recruit had no idea that his colleague, Dr. "A", had sent someone to recruit him. In this way Dr. "A" succeeded in keeping in the background and becoming known to very few people as an agent working for the X, although a number of people knew him as a member of the Doctors' Committee.

quite a different technique was used by the editor and general manager of WHF taken in the above. His method of selecting recruits was intuitive rather than anything else. After talking to a person for ten minutes he would make up his mind whether or not the person was likely to be suitable. Most of the people he recruited had been recommended in the first place by some friend of his, but sometimes he simply spotted someone and decided that he might be a useful man. WHF did not even bother to check the antecedents or background of new recruits. He worked on feeling and if this was successful. He personally tested all new recruits to the staff and said that they were never penetrated because he could "smell" a German agent without difficulty.

The NBS, after the amalgamation in the Autumn of 1944, recruited on a descending scale, that is, the District Commanders recruited the Company Commanders, who in turn recruited group leaders and so on. It was usual to check potential recruits' suitability by making a study of their activities throughout the Occupation but a thorough check was not always possible. Recruits moving from one area to another invariably knew

somebody in the

somebody in the local group, and were often accepted without question.

Some organisations did more recruiting than others. KP did not recruit much until August 1944, and at this time they only had about 500 members in the whole of the NETHERLANDS. On the other hand, OD in the WASTE alone had several thousand members. In September 1944 the need to swell the ranks of the NBS for forthcoming operations led to a period of hasty and insecure recruiting. Previously great care was taken in recruiting, and full information was obtained of potential recruits, but in September 1944 a flood of people came to be enrolled, and no check was possible. The possibility of penetration during this period is definitely a thing to be considered. In October security with regard to recruiting was tightened up.



PERIODICAL TRAINING.

PERIODICAL TRAINING.

Members of the group received instruction in the use of steel, gas, carbide, rifle, machine, pistol, and other weapons. Training varied from district to district according to the location of arms and explosives. In some areas, where there were few recruitments, training was limited to the use of weapons. In some areas, training was more extensive and explosives were ever received, and in general training was hampered by the lack of material. In the case of the London region, for instance, there were only limited weapons.

Weapon training was not entirely necessary as many recruits were ex-soldiers or policemen who were familiar with most weapons, but after September 1944, when soldiers and instructors were arriving in London from the Continent, clandestine classes were organized in most groups.

Some instructors gave their students element of instruction in fieldcraft and tactics. Instruction was given by agents sent expressly for the purpose from London and by ex-officers and soldiers from the Dutch Army or by policemen. Many agents had abroad, a good knowledge of explosives, and chemists recruited by the underground movement worked clandestinely, making up home-made explosives and instructing the underground movement in their use. The English trained instructors are usually attached to Regional Headquarters, where they trained selected men from the districts, and these men in turn would return to their districts and pass on their knowledge to the various groups under their command. Many instructors, however, went round visiting the districts and trained small groups whenever training was required. Much of this training was purely revision.

In 1944 and 1945 larger classes were arranged in towns, and agents were trained in groups of 20 to 30 at a time in swimming baths, gymnasia, dance halls etc. Small classes were held in shops, private houses, stables or garages. In the country men gathered in farmhouses to receive their training, or alternatively in fields well off the beaten track and with guards posted.

LONDON-trained instructors were in great demand in view of their specialised knowledge, but they ran a certain risk, especially when instructing large groups of men, as they became too well-known. One instructor in Rotterdam is said to have personally trained 12,000 men, and when he went out he met people he had instructed every few yards.

Arrangements for training were usually made by a liaison officer who would fix the time and place and bring the students and instructors together. Trainees would be brought to a pre-arranged contact address by girl couriers, and from there conducted by another courier

to the place

to the house where training was to take place. These  
houses were used at intervals of four times a day and  
were then abandoned. The meals and boards were usually  
provided by the training house, and in some cases  
by the village headmen. The latter provided special facilities  
such as water.

Material for the training would be taken to  
the spot every night by selected couriers and in times,  
possibly once a week, by trainees themselves. In broad  
daylight, in the country, stores and other would be left  
at farmhouses for training purposes.

Most instructors provided themselves with  
some sort of amble to cover their activities, but  
trainees rarely took the trouble.

The following extracts from reports on opera-  
tional training are of interest.

- 1) "The numbers attending informant's classes varied  
from 10 to 40. It is thought the numbers were often  
too large. Three armed sentries would patrol the  
district during the actual training hours. If  
training would vary from 2 to 10 hours a day for  
one or two days. Informant first visited one of  
these and stayed for two days in a safe house.  
These safe houses were heavily guarded always in  
arms, and informant used his same cover story. He  
hereby the local headman as a friend who had been  
flooded. Here he met and trained the local com-  
manders of the region."
- 2) "Eventually instruction was proceeding at the  
rate of about 20 to 30 a day, under much better  
conditions. It was arranged that this should  
take place in a room one way off a large hall  
from hall. About 100 to 150 men would go to the  
hall for gymnasium, and from there every  
half hour they would take 10 or 20 to a separate  
room to instruct them in arms. There was a fixed  
code word for entry. The doors were covered by  
guards, but gymnastics went on all the time, and  
the instruction went on in a separate room, which  
could not be seen from the street."
- 3) "Training was carried out by informant to groups  
of about 50 at a time. Different places were used  
for this instruction. On several occasions a room  
at a swimming-bath was used. Students would go  
singly to the swimming-bath early in the morning,  
carrying bathing-suits, and the instruction would  
go on all day, food being brought in. No look-  
outs were placed, but the attendant was in their  
confidence and would have given the alarm had it  
been necessary. They relied more on their weapons  
than on security measures for protection. The  
weapons for training were taken to the swimming-  
pool by members of the organisation in sacks, with  
an innocent article such as a broomstick protruding  
from the top."

### Security Training.

In general, no special security training was given to recruits who were deemed to be reliable and intelligent people who could be trusted to behave sensibly and who should be, in any case, familiar to the dangers of the work as a result of their having lived under occupation conditions for some time. Indeed, some recruits laughed at the idea of security training, and most were more interested in para military operations than in security. This attitude was largely overcome by instructing in combining weapon training with security and giving talks to companies on security principles. Most commanders gave detailed security briefing to their squads in command, with instructions as to the principles of security in informal talks with their group leaders.



### P A Y

It was a generally accepted principle in the Underground Movement that only those who were working full-time in Resistance, and therefore had no other means of livelihood, should be paid. Occasional workers would be paid expenses and any members who were out-of-pocket through taking part in active resistance work could count on reimbursement. A courier, for instance, who incurred travelling expenses, would be paid about 200 guilders a month.

The Underground Movement was never short of funds, and had several sources of supply, namely the NSF (Dutch Welfare Organisation), the Underground Press, taxes levied on known Black Marketeers and bank robberies. Payment was more often than not made in kind, for it was impossible to buy food, cigarettes, bicycle tyres, shoes, clothing, fuel or tea, and gifts of one or the other of these commodities would be made in lieu of cash. The NSF, with Headquarters in AMSTERDAM, controlled all the underground finances and made a monthly allotment to each of the 14 regions. The UIRECAF region, for instance, received approximately 30,000 guilders a month. The commanders of each of the three component groups of the NBS, that is, KP, RVV and OD, stated each month what money they would require, and lists were sent to the district commander of the NBS, who received the money for distribution from NSF, whose contact with NBS was usually the local LO agent. The money was handed in cash to the group leaders, who passed it down through their cells by personal contact.

In KP an unmarried man would receive 125 - 150 guilders a month, and this amount might go up to 250 or 300 guilders according to the man's dependants. Payment was never organized in a methodical way, but was done according to the merits of the individual case, those receiving payment for their regular jobs not needing to be paid by the Underground organization. Financial difficulties were very rarely experienced in any of the groups.

Care of dependants was done by NSF in close co-operation with LO agents in the district, and local groups looked after the families of married men who had been arrested or killed until such time as NSF or LO could cope with the matter.

NSF funds were derived from voluntary contributions. Many members of NSF were bankers, big business men, accountants etc. The Underground Press was able to contribute considerable sums to Resistance coffers. In the case of HET PAROOL, for instance, finances were provided by the sale of the paper. Each person who took the paper paid a subscription of 2½ guilders a month. This was not really enough to pay all the necessary salaries and other expenses of the movement, but there were also some wealthy supporters of the paper who would be able to pay special subscriptions of as much as 2,000 guilders a month. Another source of income was the large-scale Black Marketeer making huge profits, who was blackmailed and offered

protection in true gangster style in return for his cash contribution to Resistance funds. Finally, when cash was required urgently, RF could usually provide a small-scale raiding party who would raid a bank or a post-office and make off with useful sums of money. In September 1944 one RF group raided a post-office in the ROTTERDAM area and obtained 1½ million guilders.

As commodities were as important as money for Resistance purposes, the Underground had a special section to deal with the Black Market. This section sent out patrols during the night to the farms which dealt with the Black Market, and they once obtained 23 tons of sugar and 16 tons of potatoes. Resistance members obtained their own bicycles, either by buying them on the Black Market, stealing them from the Germans, or borrowing them from friends. Everybody could get food through the organisation. Food was obtained from Black Market sources. Many farmers, however, contributed willingly, and many of them were members of reception committee groups. In each town there was a special food section known as CVD, which stored and distributed clandestine stocks of food. Wehrmacht stores were also frequently raided by RF groups.



## PREMISES

### SAFE HOUSES.

These were necessary to accommodate agents arriving from England and refractaires forced to live illegally. They were rarely used for any length of time and the proprietor or tenant was usually a member of a group or on the list of sympathizers rendering occasional services.

A newly arrived agent from England was normally housed in a farm or farm labourer's cottage near the dropping point or in a house in or close by the nearest village. The local schoolmaster or priest would usually be of assistance in this respect. Frequently barges or houseboats would be used.

After spending a few days near the dropping point, the agent would journey to the town where he was to make his first contact, and here he would go to a second safe house. This second safe house was often some sort of local headquarters or rendezvous point with much coming and going and too much incriminating material on the premises. In this respect security was bad and often had an adverse effect on the morale of the agent trained in security principles in this country. The curiosity of local men, who visited the safe house merely to see the new arrival, was a constant source of danger.

Refractaires from German labour laws usually stayed in the homes of friends, changing their residence as often as possible, but, when things became too hot for them and their friends were unwilling to house them, L.O.'s Special Section would find them accommodation.

L.O. had useful contacts with estate agents and billeting authorities and could find billets with legal cover. One organization in the APPELDOORN area, working independently of L.O., was very active in housing students who were living illegally, having refused to be conscripted. This organization had a section to whom parents came for assistance when their sons had fallen foul of the labour laws. In and around APPELDOORN there are a number of small summer-houses which the group took over, and there the boys were billeted, under close supervision, until other accommodation could be found or situations obtained for them.

### LIVING ACCOMMODATION.

Indigenous agents, living quite openly and working legally under their real names, lived with their families in their own homes or with friends. Some, as in the case of ex-Army officers who had omitted to register their particulars, were, however, obliged to make certain small adjustments on their papers and remove all mention of their Army status. Many of these agents lived quite securely in their own homes throughout the Occupation, their only precaution being to keep all incriminating material elsewhere.

Agents from England and indigenous agents living illegally had the same facilities as the refractaires, and

through their group or organization applied to I.O., who obtained accommodation for them. In many cases this was unnecessary as most agents had friends or contacts who were willing to take the risk of housing them in their own homes.

#### HEADQUARTERS AND OFFICE ACCOMMODATION.

##### In Towns.

In towns a variety of premises were used, including private houses, flats, charabais, business premises, shops etc. In UTRECHT, as in other towns, about 20 addresses were used as headquarters, but not more than three, or at the most four, people lived in the same house at the same time.

Some organizations had a special engineering section which was in charge of securing the houses. They always went to view them first to see what were the prospects of hiding compromising materials etc. They invariably had a cover story for taking over a house - e.g. one was that they had been bombed out of AMSTERDAM - and, armed with false papers to verify their statements, they nearly always succeeded in their object.

Furnished or unfurnished flats or houses were afterwards rented for the organization by quite innocent people like doctors, dentists or clergymen, and then handed over to the person needing accommodation, a suitable cover story being arranged for the use of both tenant and occupant.

In THE HAGUE, the organization controlling the issue of "De Maintien d'Or" first duplicated the newspaper in the Peace Palace, where there were the necessary facilities and to which the organization had access through a woman who held an official position which enabled her to place keys at their disposal. The Peace Palace was looked upon as an international building, and the Germans always respected this. There was never any question of their having access to it. From the Peace Palace copies of the paper were transported to a grocery warehouse from which they were sent out to the distributors.

One organization in UTRECHT had a small office which was one room in a factory making tools and instruments for the Germans. The manager of the factory was the organizer's friend and allotted him this room but accepted no responsibility if the police raided the factory and discovered what was going on. If the police called at the factory the manager would inform them that he had in fact allotted this room to his friend but he had no idea on what work his friend was engaged.

The group producing false papers in UTRECHT used as headquarters a small printing factory. The firm was engaged in dye-setting, photogravure and engraving. The total personnel employed was five people, whose functions were manager, photographer and three labourers. Prior to September 1944 the firm was working quite legally and openly for industrial concerns in UTRECHT and in the region of UTRECHT, and was also producing letter-heads and various types of permit for the Wehrmacht. The clandestine work was carried out after the ordinary day's work had finished. Some or all of the staff worked every evening to supply the resistance with all types of identity cards, permits etc. Finished products were immediately removed in order that as little compromising material as possible might be left on the premises.